Commando
Operations from
On the 21st
October 1942, the ex-Pacific Steam Navigation Company luxury liner, now HMS Reina
del Pacifico embarked troops for
the landings at
Torch was, for propaganda purposes, a landing by U.S. forces supported by British warships and aircraft, in the belief that this would be more palatable to French public opinion than an Anglo-American invasion. For that reason Churchill suggested that British soldiers taking part might wear US Army uniforms, and No 6 Commando, to whom this tale relates, did so. The
General Eisenhower arrived at his Gibraltar HQ on 5th November and watched two darkened ship convoys from England pass through the strait heading for landings at Oran and Algiers. During the day and night prior to the invasion a
severe storm buffeted the convoy, adding to general apprehension about what
resistance could be expected from the
A final turkey dinner with
all the trimmings was served on the night of 7th November
acknowledging the fact that some of these men might not be alive for the
traditional U.S. Thanksgiving Dinner in three weeks time.
The assault
force, wearing their American flags and armbands, would now experience their
first taste of combat; shore batteries shelling the landing forces and being
silenced by naval guns, fierce and sporadic ground resistance, frequent
strafing and bombing attacks by enemy planes, attacks by French tanks,
artillery and infantry; all complicated by some M16 half tracks being put
ashore at unplanned points as surf and high tides affected the landings.
With the assault accomplished,
the Reina berthed in
COPP canoeists were also used for pre-assault reconnaissance. They would approach beaches undetected, determine tidal sets, surf lines, depth soundings, the slope of the beach, type of sand, enemy vigilance and patrols, obstructions and any other useful information. They prepared sketches and where possible took photographs.
For example, to determine the slope of the beach, the team would approach the beach unseen. The rating would stay with the boat whilst the officer would slip into the water in his paddler suit; a sort of semi-dry suit. Making his way to the tide line the officer would place a skewer in the sand from which to un-reel a marked line as he then floated seaward. At regular intervals he would take a sounding, using a weighted line which incorporated a hollowed out bottom, armed with a sticky substance, usually tallow, to collect samples of the sand, mud or gravel. The overall result was a gradient for that point of approach. Repeated at perhaps 50 yard intervals across the beach, the series of gradients and bottom samples were invaluable to the landing parties. This activity might take three of four nights to complete, under the nose of the enemy, hopefully without being detected and equally hoping for a successful rendezvous with their submarine.
But these parties also had a second more dangerous task, standing in close to the beach in their Folbots during the actual invasion, to mark landing points by providing visual signals to guide in the invading troops.
Considerable ingenuity
went into the Mk 2 cockles, which were designed by Fred Goatley at Saunders Roe
(SARO Aviation) under the supervision of Blondie Haslar; the prototype being tested
at Praa Sands in Cornwall. The production items included triangular inflatable
flotation-bags, for bow and stern and rigid sponsons (like a trimaran) in early
models; later models having inflatable tubes in 10 foot side pockets.
Maidstone in Gibraltar; Capt. Barney Fawkes relocated her to Algiers on 10th December.
What the teams were unaware of was that the reconnaissance part of their mission had already been completed, leaving them with the dangerous task of beach marking and assault pilotage for the invading forces.
Flag Office Gibraltar had forbidden covert landings on the beaches considering they would compromise security and warn the French of the invasion. So instead, surveillance was carried out by observation from submarines. A team had departed on board P222 (Lt. Cmdr. A J Mackenzie) on the 30th September and spent ten days making periscope reconnaissances, drawing the profiles of the hinterland to target beaches. Copies of these would be used by landing craft flotillas and at least one survey showed that an intended landing point for trucks was backed by impassable cliffs. Returning on the 9th Oct. the report was disappointing:
‘Owing to the restrictions forbidding the use of
folbots, less than half the information originally desired has been obtained,
and it is not possible to give more than an opinion on the suitability of the
beaches inspected. This inspection was done using the periscope, i.e. from a
height of eye of about 2 feet, with the swell often hiding the foreshore. The
coast was again inspected at night to ascertain that marks chosen by day are,
in fact, visible at night. The safety of the submarine, and possible watchers
ashore, prevented approaching nearer than 1½ miles; thus it is possible that
some marks may not be seen when closer than this, especially from a low height
of eye, and that other better marks are then conspicuous.’
However, some data had been collected: ‘Tidal sets variable but not more than ½ knot; no tunny nets seen at any beach; felucca fishing boats seen fishing close inshore at all beaches; the glare from the town of Mostaganem was visible about 10 miles; Arzeu town was mostly blacked out, many individual lights showing, but no glare; lookout stations on headlands do not show lights at night or ensigns by day.’
Finally, they made a general comment about
visibility from sea during their reconnaissance: ‘A layer of cloud to
landward at about 1500 feet made any identification of hills at night extremely
difficult, even at 3 miles, and objects ashore could not be identified at 1½
miles. Conditions seemed to improve further to seaward.’
Fortunately:
‘The commanding officer, HMS Minna with considerable recent experience of this
coast on special service missions, reported that, with winds of Force 3 to 4
from the north east, there were six lines of surf on ‘Z’ Beach. A considerable
ground swell was felt on each of our several visits to this beach, both by day
and by night. Land breezes from SSW and sea breezes from NE (the latter up to
Force 4) prevailed on this coast during the reconnaissance.’
These reports made it
imperative that the beach marking - at least - was spot on accurate. So, whilst
the troops were climbing down the nets into LCAs, No.6 Commando’s canoeists
were already in place at the beaches.
Low on the water, their
cockles remained unseen by the enemy and lay ready to guide the assault in. In
these early days of beach marking they rigged sea facing lamps on poles; using infrared
RG lamps which were visible only to the special IR receivers of the invading force.
In the early stage of an assault, these men operated in constant danger of discovery by the enemy. In the latter stages, as the force arrived, the threat included the likelihood of being wiped out by enemy fire and possibly even friendly fire, before their role changed to joining the assault.
L/Sgt. Weatherall of 101 Troop 6 Commando, reported:
‘On the Wednesday 4th
of November we reached the
‘At 0015 hrs we began
flashing ‘Z’ seaward by morse RG, an infra red lamp, and the U.S. Rangers’
first landing craft came in about 0115 hrs and landed on our starboard side
about ten minutes later. More craft then came in, veering off to left and right
to discharge their troops and all was very quiet for about an hour when the
first shots were heard. We guided the last craft - a tank and jeep carrier – in
just before daylight, paddled off to green and red beaches and finally boarded
the Reina del Pacifico. She was under fire from a French artillery post which
hit her twice before the gun was silenced. One shell which hit the ship knocked
out a rivet, which landed in the Captain’s washbasin.’
L/Sgt.
Weatherall remained on board the Reina for the next few days awaiting
the arrival of the former P&O liner SS Ettrick, now serving as a
troop ship, for his repatriation to the
‘I went back on board
the Ettrick and rejoined our other SBS members, who sympathised with me. Next
morning at 0845, I left the Ettrick with my canoe and gear and boarded the
The
Ettrick set out from Gibraltar joining convoy MKF-1Y but only two days
later, the seven SBS members who had left with her, were returned to the
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First published here,
December 2024. Paul Hodkinson.
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